De-Russification: Understanding the trajectory and reversibility of Armenia’s Western pivot

The following article is based on research conducted under the State Department’s Title VIII Fellowship, for the Black Sea Program at MEI. During summer 2024, the author traveled to Yerevan, Armenia, and conducted 41 interviews with government officials, private-sector representatives, and experts, focusing on politics, foreign policy, economics, defense, innovation, and Armenia’s future outlook.
 

The question of whether Armenia’s recent shift away from reliance on Russia is reversible is central to understanding its democratization trajectory. In recent years, Armenia’s dependency on Russia for security and economic stability has been severely tested, particularly during the 2020 Second Karabakh War and subsequent Azerbaijani incursions on sovereign Armenian territory, where Russia’s lack of support led to widespread disillusionment. This discontent has spurred Armenia to diversify its security, economic, and diplomatic ties, with a notable strengthening of relations with the United States. However, the sustainability of this shift remains uncertain, as it hinges on various societal factors and internal dynamics. This research examines the sentiments and dependencies that will determine whether Armenia’s shift away from Russian influence will be sustained or reversed, placing the future of Armenia’s democratization and its geopolitical alignment at a critical juncture.

Popular sentiments toward Russia

Armenia’s journey toward democratization has been marked by significant progress, driven by the resilience of its voters. Even amid crises like the aftermath of the Karabakh conflict, Armenians have consistently supported Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, as evidenced by the 2021 snap parliamentary election in which his party secured 53.95% of the vote. Despite unsupported accusations of election fraud, surveys both in February 2021 and December 2023 by the International Republican Institute (IRI) reflect ongoing support for Pashinyan’s party and a growing perception of Russia as Armenia’s biggest political and economic threat. This reflects a societal desire to reduce dependence on Russia and move toward a more independent future.

The electorate’s continued approval of Pashinyan, despite the challenges, stems from his party’s perceived ability to fulfill the public’s desire for an independent Armenia. As Styopa Saffaryan, Director of the Armenian Institute for International and Security Affairs (AIISA), noted during an interview, the population strongly prefers Pashinyan’s leadership because alternatives, like former President Robert Kocharyan, would revert to reliance on Russia.¹ This sentiment was echoed in the author’s conversation with a National Democratic Institute (NDI) representative who remarked, “What shocks me is that without fail, during the majority of my focus groups, if given the choice to vote between Pashinyan and anyone remotely associated with Russia or the past regimes, even people who used to be staunchly pro-Russian now choose Pashinyan every time.”² This was further qualified by countless informal conversations with citizens, which revealed most Armenians do not love Pashinyan but vote for him because of a commitment to rejecting Russian-backed candidates who they perceive as a source of the difficulties facing their country.

Armenia’s push to break free from Russian influence

Armenia’s journey toward democratization is underscored by its decisive efforts to reduce reliance on Russia and build stronger ties with global partners. This strategic pivot is not just about diversifying alliances but also asserting Armenia’s sovereignty and independence in the face of long-standing Russian influence.

Signs of commitment: Phasing out Russian-based security

Armenia’s February 2024 decision to freeze its membership in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an unprecedented move that signals a strong commitment to reducing Russian influence. In an interview, Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan said, “The Armenian government is actively seeking ways to secure its borders and maintain stability while navigating the challenges of potentially leaving the CSTO … which requires Armenia to enhance its bilateral relationships with other nations, particularly in the West, to compensate for the resulting security vacuum … with strategic partnerships with Georgia and Iran becoming even more significant.”³ In a subsequent interview, foreign ministry Secretary-General Davit Karapetyan emphasized the critical significance of freezing the country’s CSTO membership, stating, “This freeze means that Armenia is not taking part in any exercises, decision-making, operations, payments, or meetings. … [T]here’s no chance that Armenia is going to reverse freezing its membership in the CSTO, because this security alliance proved to be utterly useless. … Armenia wants to establish effective control over its own security.”⁴ These statements from foreign policy leadership in Yerevan make clear that Armenia’s step away from the CSTO is part of a larger vision of reforming the country’s security strategy.

In a separate discussion, a representative from Armenia’s National Security Council said, “Armenia realizes that leaving the CSTO means eventually leaving the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which would be economically challenging. … Without having an alternative, you can’t leave [Russia’s] orbit. Now that the Russians have left [Zvartnots airport], the next phase is the withdrawal [of Russian troops] from the Armenian-Iranian border, followed by the Turkish-Armenian border, and the closure of Russian military bases in Armenia.”⁵ The representative added that “constitutional changes are being considered in the context of decolonization from Russia.”⁶ These statements reflect Armenia’s clear commitment to a vision of a self-determined security framework and an understanding that a successful transformation is dependent upon diversifying economic ties away from Russia.

Economic dependencies and factors

According to Economy Minister Gevork Papoyan, Russia uses the imbalance in the economic relationship between the two countries as a crucial point of leverage over Armenia. In an interview, the minister said, “Greater than 50% of the economy currently depends on Russia overall, with over 80% in the agricultural sector,”⁷ and added that “Russia tried to intimidate and punish Armenia when it froze relations in the CSTO and had meetings with US officials.”⁸ In discussing the extent to which Russia’s economic dominance affected Armenian engagement with Western markets, Papoyan explained that Armenia’s vision is to “create an economy that does not rely on one or two large nations but is truly diversified, reduces vulnerability, and increases democratic resilience.”⁹

The reality of this dependency was further reinforced during interviews with experts on the Armenian economy. As noted by Artak Margossyan, who heads Armenia’s International Economic Development Committee, the current network of transit corridors challenges the feasibility of interaction with markets outside of Russia: “The government realizes that it has to adopt new policies to reduce dependency on Russia, but logistics are a significant part of the problem, as high transportation costs keep Armenia tethered to Russian markets where prices are much lower.”¹⁰ From Margossyan’s perspective, a determining factor in reducing Russia’s influence will be Armenia’s ability to enable the private sector to profit by accessing new markets. In his view, “Armenian businesses must understand that the future lies in reducing reliance on Russia and accessing new markets, and the government could help by subsidizing exports to bring profit to Armenian businesses and encourage market diversification away from Russia.”¹¹

Observers agree that access to new markets via transit through the Turkish border represents an attractive opportunity for Armenia to expand its export and import routes. Tigran Jrbashyan, a renowned researcher and economist based in Yerevan, reinforced this assessment, stressing that access to Mediterranean ports through Turkey “would be a game-changer, reducing Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia … which is crucial for expanding into new markets.”¹² Overall, he emphasized that “the strategic importance of opening the border with Turkey lies in transit opportunities.”¹³

Armenia’s border with Georgia is another crucial piece of the puzzle: its only open transport corridor given that Armenia abides by sanctions on Iran. According to Jrbashyan, “The only country outside of the Eurasian Economic Union with which Armenia has a free trade agreement is Georgia,” which “serves as Armenia’s gateway to the Black Sea, and thus to European and global markets.”¹⁴ In Jrbashyan’s view, regardless of Armenia’s desire to diminish economic reliance on Russia, the transit corridor through Georgia to Russia will always bear strategic significance. He mentioned the Lars tunnel specifically, which, “once completed in January 2025, is expected to increase the connectivity of the whole region with Russia, further enhancing Armenia’s trade through Georgia with Russia.”¹⁵ Although the potential impact of the expansion of the tunnel has not yet been modeled, he noted that it will alleviate current difficulties related to seasonal avalanches and road blockages and will serve as a reliable route for the transportation of goods.

Minimizing reversibility

These realities further amplify the need to augment all efforts to strengthen the democratic development of both Armenia and Georgia and to create a sustainable way for Armenia to access new markets. If Armenia is not able to expand its economic links with the West, then the likelihood of diminishing Russian influence will decrease. If the West fails to bring Armenia out of economic isolation, the potential temptation for Armenia to reverse course with Russia or expand relations with larger players like China will grow, as demonstrated by recent strategic partnership agreements with Azerbaijan and Georgia. As it stands, the US could continue strengthening the quality of its strategic partnership with Armenia by recategorizing trade relations to Group B under the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR) list. Expediting the consideration of the 123 Nuclear Agreement process, a development that the American ambassador highlighted during a June 2024 meeting at the US Embassy in Armenia, would be another way to tangibly reinforce Armenia’s energy diversification from Russia and create an opportunity for Armenia to sell electricity to its neighbors.¹⁶ Such regulatory and economic steps by the US could in turn help incentivize Turkey to open its borders with Armenia for transit to ports, further enabling economic diversification away from the EEU, keeping adversarial powers like China from expanding influence in the region, and decreasing the overall reversibility of Armenia’s effort to pivot toward the West.

 

Sarkis Karabashian is a Black Sea Department of State Title VIII Research Fellows at MEI and holds a Master of Arts degree from Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.